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ETH N I C ITY A N D TH E J U RY SYSTE M

Ashton Wesley Welch
Creig hton U n iversity
Discrimi nation in the jury system has been a matter of
constitutional and ethical concern at least since the
mid-nineteenth century. Ethnic and linguistic minori
ties have been disadvantaged by the use of the
peremptory challenge, statutory requirements, and
administrative practices which compromised the Sixth
Amendment provision for a jury of one's peers with its
implication for juror impartiality. Attacks on the dis
criminatory applications of those systems and prac
tices resulted in reduction, as gradual as it was, of the
exclusionary practices. Batson vs Kentucky made the
Sixth Amendment guarantee more reachable for eth
nic and linguistic minorities.
The campaign to eliminate ethnic bias from the jury system and
to make panels conform more closely to the ideal of trial by a
jury of one's peers has been long and tortuous. As with much
of the legal system the enti re system of trial by j u ry is often
manipulated to discri minate against members of cognizable
groups including ethnic and linguistic m inorities. That manipu
lation of the system occurs is not surprising. The selection
process, the wider judicial system and its traditions , and the
pluralistic natu re of the American nation lend themselves to it.
The United States Department of Justice counted ninety-two
different methods to select jurors in the federal system . 1 When
the vast panoply of state and local courts are added to the fed
eral system the variety becomes almost unfathomable.
Trial by jury is rooted in law and tradition . It is widely
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accepted that the p ractice existed in England by the end of the
thirteenth century. English settlers took it to the colonies in the
early seventeenth century.
Colonial practices concerning
juries and trial procedu res were enshrined in the Fifth , Sixth ,
and Seventh amendments of the U nited States Con stitution
after the Revolution. The Sixth guarantees the right to a trial by
jury with the p rovision that "In all criminal p rosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of State and district wherein the crime shall have
been comm itted . . . . " The Constitution leaves the operation of
state and local cou rts , including aspects of forming j uries, to
the states for non-federal matters hence the g reat variety of
jury p ractices at the state and local levels.
Some u niformity exists i n the jury selection p rocess
nonetheless . In most j u risdictions there are th ree major phas
es to the p rocess. First there is identification of a q ualified
pool . Membership is obtained from lists of payers of p roperty
taxes, registered voters , holders of valid d river l icenses , names
contributed by comm u nity leaders , telephone subscri bers , or
from some othe r repository taken to be representative of the
public at large. C reation of the venire is the second step.
Some members of the pool identified i n phase one are sum
moned for a specific trial . Some ju risdictions permit ven i remen,
those called for phase two, to disqualify themselves on p re
senting of a valid excuse. Physical condition, occupation, and
employment are but three of the acceptable myriad of valid
excuses. The last step is the voir dire. Voir dire means literal
Iy "to see to tel l ." In it potential ju rors taken from the venire are
subjected to oral q u estioni n g by the judge, by attorneys to the
suit, or by all of them . D u ring the voir dire or at its end the
venire pool is culled to p rovide the actual trial jury and alter
nates if the j u risdiction p rovides for alternates.
The reduction of the venire to p roduce the trial j u ry is
achieved mainly through a system of challenges and addition
al disqualifications. There are two types of challenges: cause
and peremptory. A challenge for cause may be i nvoked when
ever a member of the venire indicates or demonstrates some
actual or potential partiality to the case. Each side of a case
can use an u n l i m ited n u m be r of challenges for cause.
Peremptory challenges on the other hand are l i m ited . The
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n umber is established by the politi cal o r j udicial j u risdiction .
Traditionally attorneys from either side could use them to elim
inate p rospective j u ro rs from the venire pool without having to
state either cause or explanation . A pere mptory challenge is
therefore a m echanism to e l i m inate those p rospective j u ro rs
who the attorney bel ieves, but cannot o r is unwi l l i n g to p rove ,
will act less favo rably than othe r members of the venire to his
or her client.
The peremptory challenge is rooted in traditio n . Accord i n g
t o Blackstone, it was i n u s e i n England at t h e begi n n i n g o f the
fou rteenth century. As with many othe r aspects of American
legal p rocedu res , the p ractice i m m ig rated to the Americas with
English colonists . The U nited States Supre m e Court catego
rized it to be "a n ecessary part of trial by j u ry." U ntil the 1 980s
the Court almost routinely rejected attacks on the use of
pere mptory challenges even when it was obvious that peremp
tories were used to skew the replication of the ethnic q u i lt of
American society i n j u ries.2
The issue of ethn icity and j u ries a rose shortly after the
Constitution was ratified. As in m uc h of the debate on
American race relations the issue was framed mainly i n the
White-Black dichotomy. N ative Americans and Asian mattered
little. J u ry service was tied to citizenshi p , and few of eithe r
g roup attained citizenship u ntil relatively recently.
While
Congress g ranted citizenship to members of some tribal
g roups in the n i n eteenth and early twentieth centu ries, Native
American citizensh i p was recogn ized only in 1 924 and fully set
tled in 1 940 by the N ationality Act. Asians becam e eligible for
citizenship even later. As for African Americans, fede ral law
was ambiguous on the natu re of slaves : they were both chattel
and persons. The Constitution and fugitive slave acts , m ost
notably the ori g i nal Fugitive Slave Law of 1 793, mandated the
return of escaped slaves . Without exception all states p rovid
ed for trial by j u ry. Constitutions of the various states did not
deviate m uch from the Seventh Amendment p rovision that "in
s uits of common law, where the val u e in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars , the right of trial by jury shall be p re
served . . . n Theoretically, the refore , q uestions on owne rship
of alleged slaves could be answered by j u ries. Withi n thei r
borders f ree states tended not to recogn ize the chattel quality,
1 06

Wel c h"",-, u ry System

and therefore the monetary value, of a slave . Such states
regarded slaves as persons before the law. For purposes of
recovery slave owners also emphasized the h u man aspect of
alleged fugitives . As an individual a reputed fugitive slave was
entitled to a j u ry trial in free states. Federal law took precedent
on this issue however. Consistent with the Article IV Section 2
of the Constitution , apprehended alleged slave fugitives were
extradited or otherwise retu rned to the pu rported place of thei r
escape without trial.
I n the 1 830s some states enacted personal liberty laws to
frustrate the slave retu rning procedures. Personal liberty laws
reversed that basic tenet of the slavery era that African
Americans were slaves u nless it was proven to the contrary.
Not only did they take a black person to be free unless and until
it was establ ished that he or she was a slave, such statutes
also provided for j u ry trials before an alleged fugitive could be
removed from the state. Most proponents of personal liberty
laws were not concerned with the civil rights and duties of
African Americans however. Motivated primari ly by the issue
of states rights, some advocates of personal l iberty laws
objected to what they regarded as needless fede ral i ntrusion
into prerogatives of the states though the national govern
ment's enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act. They also
believed that the jury trial requ i rement would dissuade bounty
h unters and other agents of slave masters.
Motivations aside, the Supreme Cou rt and the Congress
u nderm i n ed personal l iberty laws. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
1 842, while it affi rmed the constitutionality both of the Fugitive
Slave Law and personal l iberty statutes the Supreme Court
i nval idated trial and j u ry provisions of the latter. 3 The Court
rel ied heavily on Article IV Section 2 which held that:
No person held to Service of Labor in one State,
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shal l ,
i n Consequence of a n y Law or Regulation therei n , be
discharged from such Service or Labor, but shall be
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom and
Service or Labor may be due.
In the Court's thinking, Article IV Section 2 vitiated any
state law o r holding that conferred freedom to an alleged fugi
tive slave. H ence it nullified the issue of a jury trial for any pre1 07
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sumed fugitive. Congress reaffirmed the right to remove
alleged fugitive slaves without trial i n 1 850 when it re-author
ized the fugitive slave act.
While it became embedded in the debate over slavery, the
issue of African Americans and juries was in no means limited
to practices l inked to the "peculiar i nstitution." It should be
remembered that federal citizenship was relatively i nconse
quential in contrast to state citizenship on issues most likely to
involve the judiciary. I n m uch of the slave-free North states
continued to make j u ry service a p rerogative of Whites. For
example, in 1 807, as Congress debated term i nation of the
international slave trade, New Jersey, with a tradition of choos
ing j u rors from lists of qualified voters, adopted a new constitu
tion with a white suffrage only requ i rement. In a more di rect
manner, Ohio enacted a law in 1 831 to remove the right of
African Americans to sit on juries. And it was only on the eve
of the Civil War, in 1 860, that Massachusetts's social exclusion
of African Americans as j u rors was breached .
The question of ethnic m inorities and j u ries took new
di rections i n the aftermath of the Civil War. With the abolition
of slavery, whether African Americans were equal before thei r
respective states' laws, with the same rights, privi leges and
obligations as Whites , i ncluding trial by and service on juries,
became an issue of presidential reconstruction. States recon
structed under the Lincoln-Johnson plans answered no.
Moreover federal juries in such states tended to be al l-white
and it was common for them to return what m ight be termed
anti-black and anti-Union decisions. In the beginning the issue
was justice for African Americans at the hands of all-white
j u ries in the ex-confederacy. The matter soon expanded to the
right of African Americans to serve on ju ries in state and feder
al cou rts and the quality of justice for all. The i nabi lity of fed
eral prosecutors to get convictions of ex-Confederates by all
white j u ries was cited by African Americans, Northerners , and
their sympathizers as proof of the failure of southern justice.
Radical Republicans and many Northerners thought that
African Americans should have been given full access to j u ri es
if for no other reason than to balance the scales for the gov
ernment. White Northerners assumed that interracial j u ri es
would provide more even-handed justice for African Americans
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as wel l as for Whites. Buttressed by thei r notions of equality
before the law and the u nfai rness of j ustice in the South ,
Radical Republicans drafted the Fou rteenth Amendment and
enacted a host of statutes, including the Civil Rights Acts of
1 866 and 1 875 and the Enforcement Act of 1 872 , designed to
enhance and protect the citizenship rights of Blacks. The Civil
Rights Act of 1 875 made it a cri m i nal offense to exclude any
one from j u ry service on g rounds of race . It also i ncluded the
corrective provision that i n i nstances of discrimination in the
selection process any party to a suit could petition to have the
case transferred to a federal district cou rt.
The transfer and cri m i nal provisions of the Civi l Rights Act
of 1 875 had l ittle meaning from the time they were enacted.
Attorneys found it difficult to prove that racial prejudice was a
reason African Americans were om itted from j u ries.
As
Reconstruction waned, ex-Confederates and the i r spi ritual
allies reestabl ished white supremacy across the South: some
did so by stealth ; othe rs straightforwardly discrim i nated against
African Americans without fear of punishment or censure.
Some localities enacted statutes that l i mited the rights and priv
ileges of African Americans. On the j udicial front, the discri m i 
natory d rive was slowed b y t h e Supreme C o u rt i n 1 880 i n Ex
parte Virginia with its reversal of decisions by Virginia j udges to
l imit j u ries i n thei r cou rt rooms to white men only.4
In Strauder v. West Virginia, also decided i n 1 880, the High
Cou rt i nval idated state statutes which l i m ited j u ry service to
white males as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fou rteenth Amendment. An African American, Strauder was
indicted, tried, and eventually convicted by an all-white jury i n
a West Virginia county court. P rior to the jury's deliberation his
attorney p rotested against the exclusion of African Americans
from the j ury. He i nvoked the transfer provision of the Civil
Rights Act of 1 875 and petitioned to remove the case to a fed
eral cou rt. The trial court denied his objection and the trial pro
ceeded. The attorney renewed h is protests after the j u ry ren
dered its decision. In additional motions , he moved to quash
the conviction and asserted that the act which l i m ited jury serv
ice to Caucasian males violated the Equal P rotection Clause
because it denied his client the right of trial by a jury i nclusive
of h is racial peers as afforded to Whites. The trial and superi1 09
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o r state courts rejected all of his motions. A d ivided U nited
States Supreme Court concluded otherwise: it held that defen
dants are entitled to j u ries composed of the i r "neighbors , fel
lows , associates, persons having the same legal status i n soci
ety as . . . " themselves. Writi ng for the m ajority, J ustice William
Strong added that to deny African Ameri cans the right to par
ticipate i n the administration of law b randed them as i nferior
and contributed to i nciting ''that race p rej udice which is an
i mpediment to securing to individuals of the [Negro] race that
equal j ustice which the law aims to secure to all others." Any
positive potential of Strauder and its p rogen ies was not real
ized u ntil relatively late because a defendant had to show
i ntentional discri m ination by cou rt officials. Furthermore adher
ing to a principle enunciated i n Smith V. Mississippi, 1 896, the
Court operated on the p resumption that a state's action was
constitutional and correct u nless a petitioner p roved othe r
wise.S
The Virginias were but two of the states that kept African
Americans ineligible for j u ry duty. I n the Strauder decision the
Court ruled that it was a clear denial of equal p rotection of the
laws for a black d efendant to stand trial before a j u ry f ro m
which all African Americans were excluded b y state statute.
The Cou rt posited that "the very idea of a j u ry is a body of men
composed of the peers o r equals of the person whose rights it
is selected o r s u mmoned to d ete rm i n e . . . . " And, cogn izant
that "prejudice often exists against particular classes withi n the
comm u nity, which sway the j udgment of j u ro rs , " the Court
asked rhetorically:
Is not p rotection of l ife and l i be rty against race or color
p rej udice , a right, a legal right, under the constitutional amendment? And how can it be mai ntained that
compell i n g a colored man to submit to a trial for his l ife
by a j u ry d rawn from a panel from which the State has
expressly excluded every man of his race, because of
color alone , however well qualified in other respects,
is not a denial to h i m of equal legal p rotection?6
Consistent with constitutional law, Strauder was a solution
for a specific p roblem . Hence while Strauder see m i ngly made
it clear that states could not use legislation to bar African
Americans from j u ry service the ruling did not address other
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strategies contrived to produce the all-white jury. Delaware, for
example, allowed local j urisdictions to select "sober and j udi
cious" persons for j u ry service from taxpayer l ists. U nder that
system , black taxpayers were ostensibly qualified for jury serv
ice but were rarely selected for the jury pool. In ruling to a chal
lenge of the continuing exclusion of African Americans from
juries, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the State's
contention that very few of the African Americans in Delaware
were intelligent, experienced, or moral enough to serve as
j u rors. Seeking to rectify discriminatory administration of
racially fai r j u ry selection laws to achieve discrimi natory results
the Cou rt extended the premise of Strauder i n Neal v
Delaware.7
Neal was a hol low advance however. The same day that
it handed down the Strauder and Ex parte Virginia decisions
the Court, i n Virginia v Rives, emasculated the transfer provi
sion of the Civi l Rights Act of 1 875, ruling that the absence of
African Americans from a particular jury was not persuasive
proof of i llegal state discri m ination. The Court stated clearly
that while black defendants are entitled to j u ries chosen free of
discrimination against members of their race, no black defen
dant is entitled to a j u ry which contains members of his or her
race.a Thereafter a case could not be transferred to federal
courts before a j u ry was i m paneled .
The causative elements i n Strauder and Rives were i ndi
cators of the d rift toward "separate but equal." In the re-cast
ed i nequal ity, Southe rn states lim ited political participation of
African Americans th rough the use of comprehension tests,
poll taxes, and other well-chronicled means to purge African
Americans from the political system . In spite of the connective
l i n ks between political participation and j u ry service the
Supreme Court found discrim inatory political statutes constitu
tional . The segregationist d rive to exclude African Americans
from j u ries received heightened sanction i n 1 898 with the deci
sion i n Williams v. Mississippi i n which the Cou rt upheld
M ississippi's use of gerrymanderi ng, poll taxes, and subjective
l iteracy tests to l i m it or prevent the political participation of
African Americans and especially to prevent them from regis
tering to vote. Then, having al ready placed its constitutional
imprimatur on M ississippi's political practice, the Cou rt held
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that since the state's voting statutes were constitutional u nder
the Fifteenth Amendment, its law restrictin g jury service to reg
istered voters was likewise constitutional even if few African
Americans m et the reg istration requirements. Justice Oliver
Wendell Hol mes seemingly expressed the Court's reasoning
with his decision i n Giles v. Harris; he wrote that the Cou rt
lacked the power to protect the rig hts of African Americans
when overwhelming n umbers of Whites were determ ined to
violate them .9 A number of Southern states followed the
M ississippi example after the Wil liams decision. The end result
was with the severe reduction of the numbe r of qualified black
registrants the potential pools of black j urors were m uch
restricted since voter registration lists were the most popular
source of potential jurors.
Some African Americans managed to overcome the hur
dles designed to prevent or to limit thei r political participation
and, ostensibly, therefore, some were eligible for jury duty. It
was rare, however, for many of them to be summoned for duty
and rarer sti l l for any of them to serve. Cou rt officials and oth
ers with ancil lary j udicial functions routinely s ki pped over the
seemingly q ual ified few until 1 935 with the decision i n Norris v.
Alabama . 1 0

Norris lessened the b u rden of proof for defendants by forc
i n g states to defend practices which had discri m i natory
i mpacts. For the first ti me the Court suggested that lower
courts should be guided by statistics when considering objec
tions to alleged discriminatory uses of peremptory challenges.
The i nfamous "Scottsboro boys" case, Norris was an appeal by
a black male of his conviction by an all-white jury of raping a
white female. I n a partial reversal of the Rives doctrine, the
Supreme Court held that a defendant could prove a prima facie
case of discrimination if he or she could demonstrate (a) the
existence of a substantial number of his or her cognizable
group i n the community and (b) its total exclusion from jury
service . U pon a defendant demonstrating those ''facts,'' the
burden of proof shifted to the state to prove that the exclusion
was not a product of discri m ination . The Court noted that gen
eral denials of u n intentional discri m ination could not satisfy the
burden of rebuttal.
Norris was but an opening. As before , officials altered dis112
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cri minatory practices to satisfy specific objections of the Court
but without i ntention to institute jury equality. A common adjust
ment was to add a few minorities to the identified pool and
occasionally to jury panels. Often times minorities were added
to general pools and removed before or during the voir dire.
Such subterfuge did not go unchallenged. Advocates of minor
ity inclusion attacked the chicanery. As cases arose that
i nvolved token inclusion of m inorities , rather than their total
exclusion , the Supreme Court broadened the Norris thesis,
fi rst, to i nstances of gross under-representation 11 and, then , to
cases where a substantial disparity between minority group
members i n the com munity and on the jury list "originated, at
least i n part, at the point in the selection process where the jury
commissioners i nvoked their subjective j udgement rather than
objective criteria." This drift culmi nated i n 1 977 with the ruling
i n Castaneda v. Partida, a decision that held a prima facie proof
of discrim ination was established by a demonstration of pro
longed u nder representation from a cognizable group. 1 2
The Cou rt had not become tolerant of proportional repre
sentation however: far from it. I n 1 965 in Swain v. Alabama it
considered the use of the peremptory challenge for discrimina
tory purposes for the fi rst time. Swain represented stil l anoth
er appeal of a black male convicted by an all-white jury of the
rape of a white female. No black person had served on a petit
jury in Talladega County, where the trial was held, in the fifteen
years before 1 965 although twenty-SiX percent of those quali
fied for jury service were black. I n the voir dire, the prosecutor
used his peremptory challenges to eliminate all six African
Americans on the venire. On appeal the Supreme Court was
asked whether the Equal Protection Clause prevented the total
exclusion of African Americans from a petit j ury. Counsel for
Swain argued that this was not a singular case of utilizing
peremptories i n a racially discri m inatory fashion . Although it
agreed with defense counsel that no African American had sat
on any type of j u ry in the county in modern times, the Cou rt,
noted that i n several cases the defense had agreed with the
prosecution not to i nclude African Americans i n juries, held that
Swain's attorney had not proven that the state alone was at
fault for the discri m inatory resu lts. The Court observed that a
Fourteenth Amendment issue would be raised if the defendant
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could prove that regardless of the charge or the parties to the
cri me Talladega County prosecutors used their challenges sys
tematical ly to eliminate all African Americans on venires from
duty on juries. However, the action was not unconstitutional if
the state limited its exclusion of black veni remen to cases with
black defendants "for the question a prosecutor or defense
counsel must decide is not whether a juror of a particular race
or nationality is in fact partial, but whether one from a different
group is less likely to be."
Holding that the defendant had failed to prove that the
prosecution used its peremptory challenges to deliberately
exclude African Americans from the jury, the Court declared
that the "presumption in any particular case must be that the
prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a fai r and
impartial jury. . . . The presumption is not overcome [even if]
all Negroes were removed because they were Negroes ." To
overcome the presumption , the Court ruled, a defendant had to
demonstrate that the state followed a consistent pattern of dis
crimination in "case after case, whatever the circumstances ,
whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or victim."
Moreover, the defendant had to differentiate between the
defense's and prosecution's peremptory challenges in order to
establ ish a discriminatory motive . 1 3 No defendant was able to
meet the standards of systematic exclusion establ ished in the
decision .
Moreover, state and federal courts alike did not
countenance presentation of evidence from only cases which
i nvolved black defendants. 1 4
Swain represented a judicial use of tradition. As early as
1 883, in Bush v. Kentucky, the Court had ruled that the
Constitution does not require that a trial jury must contain
members of the same race as a party to a suit but simply pre
vents the state from arbitrarily eliminating members of her or
his cognizable group. Bush was but one of a score of chal
lenges to the system of peremptory challenges. The Court was
adamant that the Constitution forbids the systematic exclusion
of members of cognizable groups from jury panels without
requiring i ncl usion of representation from groups in such bod
ies. The Court restated its position in Apodaca v. Oregon in
which it held that no defendant had the right to "challenge the
makeup of a jury merely because no members of his race are
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on the ju ry" for there is no constitutional requirement that every
particular jury be representative . 1 5 Thus, while the Cou rt
accepted, for a time i n Akins v. Texas, 1 6 the practice of the Jury
Commissioner of Dal las County of never including more than a
single African American in grand juries as a "good faith effort"
in compliance with the ruling, in Hill v. Texas, 17 it eventually
found the practice odious and unacceptable. According to
Associate Justice Frank Murphy, the Equal Protection Clause
guarantees "not only the right to have Negroes considered as
prospective veniremen but also the right to have them consid
ered without numerical or proportional limitation." As stated in
Cassell v. Texas, it is unconstitutional to i nclude a predeter
mined number of any cognizable group, even that to which a
minority defendant belongs, for ju rors "should be selected as
individuals , on the basis of individual qualifications, and not as
members of a race." 18
While sti l l rel uctant to consider the use of peremptory chal
lenges the Court addressed the notion of group affiliation more
directly in 1 954 in Hernandez v. Texas. Texas had continued
to rely on the key-man system to select juries; community lead
ers provided jury commissioners with names for jury lists . Most
key-men were White as were most of their identified prospects.
M inorities especially persons of Mexican heritage were severe
ly u nder represented in jury lists . I n Hernandez the Court
accepted the assertion that Mexican-Americans constituted a
cognizable class. It then proceeded to rule that an admi nistra
tion of jury selection procedu res so as to exclude Mexican
Americans or to minimize their participation was as much a vio
lation of equal protection as if it had been done against African
Americans. I n the words of the Court:
When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrat
ed, and it is further shown that the laws , as written or
as applied, single out that class for different treatment
not based on some reasonable classification, the
guarantees of the Constitution have been violated.
The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely
against discrimination due to a two-class theory-that
i s , based upon d ifferences between white and
Negro. 1 9
The Court also dealt with other procedural questions with
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beari ng on juries and minorities. The right to invoke cause is
prem ised on the realization that i ndividuals hold prejudices that
might hinder thei r ability to be fai r and impartial . Prejudice can
be ethnic and racial. While it does not guarantee perfection ,
the voir dire is an opportune process to discover any prejudice
that might affect a juror's impartiality. Rules of judicial behav
ior restrict the questions which attorneys and j udges m ight ask
potential jurors however. Nevertheless in People v. Reyes,20
with Mexican nationals as defendants, in People v. Car Soy
which involved Chinese ,21 Horst v. Silverman,22 a case i n which
Jews were parties, and Aldridge v. United States, an appeal by
an African American,23 the Court declared that there are spe
cial conditions when the "essential demands of fai rness" com
mand that veniremen be questioned about racial or ethnic prej
udices. I n a series of later decisions, the Court delineated the
very limited circumstances when voir dire questioning to dis
cern such biases is perm issible.24
The High Court also held that illegal discrimination i n con
stituting of either the g rand or the petit jury mandates reversal
of any resulting conviction25. Then going further, and casting
aside technicalities, the Court i n Turner v. Fouche26 and in
Carter v. Jury CommissioJ127 accepted the right of black citizens
not directly i nvolved in a specific exclusion case to challenge
the systematic excl usion of African Americans from petit and
grand juries. According to the Carter majority "Whether jury
service be deemed a right, a privilege, or a duty, the State may
no more extend it to some of its citizens and deny it to others
on racial g rounds than it may invidiously discri m inate i n the
offering and withholding of the elective franchise."
The decision i n Peters v. Kiff extended that rationale to
Whites . I n Peters, a white male defendant protested against
the systematic exclusion of African Americans from the g rand
and petit j u ries which, respectively, indicted and tried and con
victed h i m . Before his appeal could be considered on its mer
its, the question of whether white persons had standing to raise
the issue of systematic exclusion of African Americans had to
be decided. A divided Court said they did. Writi ng for the
majority, J ustice Thu rgood Marshall held that:
When any large and identifiable segment of the com
munity is excl uded from jury service, the effect is to
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remove from the jury room qualities of human natu re
and varieties of h uman experience, the range of which
is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not neces
sary to assume that the excl uded group will consis
tently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do,
that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on
human events that may have u nsuspected impor
tance i n any case that may be presented .28
President Lyndon B. Johnson echoed Marshall's position
in his cal l for the Civil Rights Act of 1 966. The Civil Rights Act
of 1 966 was motivated in part by a desi re to eliminate discrim
inatory practices condoned by the Swain decision . The im me
diate inspiration behind the bill, however, was the acquittal of
several white defendants charged with crimes against African
Americans and civil rights workers by all-white juries. In rec
ommending corrective action to Congress , President Johnson
evoked parallels of the Reconstruction era's notion of commu
nity and com munity service, with the assertion that to deny
. . . j u ry service to any group deprives it of one of the
oldest and most precious privileges and duties of free
men. It is not only the excluded g roup which suffers.
Courts are denied the j ustice that flows from impartial
juries selected from a cross section of the com munity.
The people's confidence in justice is eroded.29
Title I deals with federal juries. It prohibits discrimination on
account of color, race , religion, gender, economic status , or
national origi n . Its i nitial section reaffi rms that "all l itigants in
Federal Courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to a
jury selected from a cross section of the community i n the dis
trict or d ivision where the cou rt convenes . . . . " It declares that
"all qualified citizens shall have the opportunity to serve on
grand and petit ju ries" i n federal cou rts and "shall have an obli
gation to serve when summoned ." It also establ ished proce
dures for the selection of j u rors.
Title II aims to eliminate discrimination i n state and local
j u ries pri marily th rough judicial , rather than administrative ,
means. Section 201 holds that
it shall be unlawfu l to make any disti nction on account
of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or econom
ic status in the qualifications for service, and i n the
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selection , of any person to serve on grand or petit
juries in any state.
The Act commissions the Attorney General to sue in federal
cou rt
whenever there are reasonable g rounds t o believe
that any person has engaged or is about to engage in
any act or practice which would deny or abridge" any
of the guarantees of Section 20 1 ." If it determined
there were violations of the Act's jury provisions the
cou rt can force state officials to use "objective criteria"
in formulati ng jury I ists.30
A number of states also moved to end the systematic
abuse of the right to a jury of one's peers. Cal ifornia led the
way. ln People v. Wheeler the California Supreme Court ruled
that the use of peremptory challenges to disqualify prospective
jurors simply on grounds of g roup affiliation violated Article I
Section 1 6 of the California Constitution .3 1 The California opin
ion also rested on Taylor v. Louisiana,32 a judgment by the
U nited States Supreme Cou rt that one's peers required trial
juries and not merely venires to have a cross section of the
population . The California jurists went further and added that
a petit j u ry should reflect as ideally a cross section of the com
munity as random selection would produce. Like the U.S.
Supreme Cou rt in Swain , the Cal ifornia court formulated stan
dards to establish a prima facie condition to assert the use of
peremptories in an ethnically biased manner. Either the
defense or the prosecution can object to a seemingly discrimi
natory use of peremptories and neither side has to be a mem
ber of the cognizable g roup it claimed was illegally excluded.
Massachusetts and N ew M exico fol lowed suit i n
Commonwealth v. Soares33 and State v. Crespif134 respective
ly. The Massachusetts court held peremptories could not be
used in a fashion so as to make meaningless the state consti
tutional guarantee of a petit jury of one's peers or to infringe
upon the state's Equal Rights Amendment which prohibits any
abridging of equality on the basis of color, creed, gender, race,
or national origin.
Wheeler, Soares, and similar decisions withstood attacks
of their constitutionality in federal courts because they rested
on their states' constitution and not on federal statutes.
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Though it continued to adhere to Swain the Supreme Court
was not u nalterably opposed to reconsidering its position . I n
the interim a n d over the repeated objections o f justices William
Brennan and Marshall , it waited to "allow the various states to
serve as laboratories i n which the issue receives further study
before it is addressed by this Cou rt" again. Joined by Brennan ,
Marshall attacked the majority's "experimentation with the
rights, and l ives of petitioners"; in his dissent in Gilliard v
Mississippi he wrote:
When a majority of this Court suspects that such
rights are being regularly abridged, the Court shrinks
from its constitutional duty by awaiting developments
in state or other federal courts. Because abuse of
peremptory challenges appears to be most prevalent
in capital cases, the need for immediate review i n this
Court is all the more u rgent. If we postpone consid
eration of the issue much longer, petitioners in this
and si m i lar cases wil l be put to death before their con
stitutional rights can be vindicated. U nder the circum
stances , I do not understand how i n good conscience
we can await further developments, regardless of how
helpful those developments might be to our own
deliberations.35
Marshall also chided his brethren that
there is no point in taking elaborate steps to ensure
Negroes are included in venires simply so they can be
struck because of their race by a prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges."36
The delayed reconsideration came in Batson v. Kentucky,
a radical ruling on peremptories. For the fi rst time, a federal
cou rt agreed that an attorney can be forced to explain his or
her reason for invoking a peremptory. It provided release from
the untenable situation created by Swain. The issue was
framed starkly in the "Question Presented" to the Court by
Batson's counsel on appeal :
I n a crimi nal case, does a state trial court err when,
over the objection of a black defendant, it swears an
all-white j u ry constituted only after the prosecutor had
exercised fou r of his six peremptory challenges to
strike all of the black veniremen from the panel in vio119
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lation of constitutional provisions guaranteeing the
defendant an i mpartial jury and a jury composed of
persons representing a fai r cross section of the com
munity?
The "Question" encapsulated the facts. James Ki rkland
Batson had been charged with burglary and the receipt of
stolen goods. At the end of the voir dire the prosecutor, M r.
G utman , used four of his six peremptories to create, in his
words, an "all-white jury." Defense counsel, M r. Douglas
Dowell, moved for dismissal of the panel before it was sworn
on grounds that the panel did not represent a cross-section of
the community and to use it would be a denial of equal protec
tion . The judge deni ed the motion to discharge the ju ry.
Batson was tried and duly convicted. The Kentucky Supreme
Court upheld the conviction , in 1 984, holding that it had
"recently reaffirmed [its] reliance on Swain" and because
Batson had not shown "systematic exclusion from the jury" he
did not have a claim under Swain .37 The Supreme Court dis
agreed. It reversed Batson's conviction holding that the impan
eling of the jury resulted in a denial of equal protection. In rUl
ing that when an objection is lodged against an alleged racial
ly discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge the trial court
must examine the validity of the claim , the United Supreme
Court continued the i ncremental reform to make the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of trial by a cross-section of the com
munity meaningful for all. I n so doing the Court not only
reversed Swain but also m ight have opened a new Pandora's
box, creating a second category of peremptory challenges.
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